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CUD333G.TXT
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1994-11-01
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Date: Tue, 10 Sep 91 11:45:43 PDT
From: Dark Adept <dadept@unixville.uunet.uu.net>TNET>
Subject: File 7--Review of Site Security Handbook (by Dark Adept)
(Reviewed by Dark Adept)
The RFC 1244 - Site Security Handbook Reviewed
The Dark Adept
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
The RFC (Request for Comment series) has produced a new tome:
The Site Security Handbook. This little gem aired on July 26, 1991 on
the newsgroup comp.doc. At 250K+, it is a somewhat large file to
transfer around, but well worth it.
It has its good points and bad points, but the good seem to outweigh
the bad. So, saving the best for last, I will address some of the
major bad points first.
I. Stereotyping and other falsities
-----------------------------------
This document completely explodes hacker myths and stereotypes. Here
is an example:
"As an illustration of some of the issues that need to be dealt with
in security problems, consider the following scenarios (thanks to
Russell Brand [2, BRAND] for these):
- A system programmer gets a call reporting that a
major underground cracker newsletter is being
distributed from the administrative machine at his
center to five thousand sites in the US and
Western Europe.
Eight weeks later, the authorities call to inform
you the information in one of these newsletters
was used to disable "911" in a major city for
five hours." (RFC1244 p. 6)
Very cute. Very believeable. Very much impossible, and very much a
lie. I think we all know what this refers to (the Phrack/E911
incident), and I think that it is unprofessional of the editors of RFC
1244 to use this example which is nothing more than a scare tactic.
Also please note that all the examples, while not as blatant as this,
deal with someone on the outside breaking in. It makes one wonder why
this is true when later in the document the editors state:
"As an example, there is a great deal of publicity about intruders on
computers systems; yet most surveys of computer security show that for
most organizations, the actual loss from "insiders" is much greater."
(RFC1244 p. 10)
Why oh why, then, are all your examples so one-sided? Why the
stereotyping of intruders? Why the little E911 parody?
II. Relies more on accepted sources than reality
-------------------------------------------------
Over and over and over and over again, ad nauseum, this manual refers
to those security gods, CERT. Allow me to let you in on a little
secret. CERT has not said anything revolutionary. In fact, much of
what CERT says, and much of what is stated in this manual, has been
found in hacker G-Philes over the years.
examples:
"...the Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC)
at Carnegie-Mellon University (CMU) estimates that 80% or more of the
problems they see have to do with poorly chosen passwords." (RFC1244
p. 8)
Gee, does that sound familiar, or what? Every G-Phile around has in
bold-faced italicized triple underlined print: "Try his wife's maiden
name" or "try his name backwards" or "here is a list of common
passwords" or, more to the point "people are idiots when they choose
passwords" (hmm. I think that particular one was in one of my
previous CuD articles).
Here is another "cute" one:
"The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT - see section 3.9.7.3.1)
has observed that well-known universities, government sites, and
military sites seem to attract more intruders." (RFC1244 p. 12)
Those veritable gods of observation! Gee, what would hackers break
into? Maybe John Doe's collection of x-rated .gifs? I doubt it. In
fact, 90% or more of every "hacker's atlas" (a G-Phile which is more
or less a phonebook of data lines and who owns them) consists of phone
numbers to the above named institutions.
The main point is that RFC1244 does nothing more than collect
statistics from G-Philes. This in itself is useful, however, but it
would be more beneficial if the editors read the G-Philes themselves
rather than using watered down information from CERT et al.
Now for the good points. There are so many that I dare not try to
list them all, just some highlights.
It contains an extensive overview of a step-by-step way to implement
security. From deciding who is to be involved to selecting a method
(or methods) of security, this document mentions it.
It has a list of many resources such as (ugh!) CERT, magazines
(on-line and printed), software companies, etc. This is good since it
provides the prospective securer with a starting point.
It deals with security issues not usually thought of until a disaster
happens, such as: how much should we tell the press? who should we
notify? etc.
This handbook is directed mainly at the Internet user/sysadmin, but it
can be applied to a PC in a dentist's office. For a security novice,
or someone who just wants to find out what real security entails, this
is the book, and it's free!
So, before you go hiring Tacky Thacky or ex-LoD, read this handbook
first. At least then you'll know what you're buying.
My rating: 3.5 hacks (out of 4). It loses the 0.5 for the
stereotypes and lack of first hand info, but otherwise something to
have around the office/terminal.
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